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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
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McRAE, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
· v. Cue No. 
MARY RENZO and TONY RENZO, I 
Defendants, 11076 
and 
JESSE GALLO and LENA GALLO, 
his wife, 
I nterpleaded Defendants-Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the orders signed by the Honorable 
D. F. Wilkins of the District Court of Salt Lake County 
and the judgment predicated thereon, by the Honorable 
Sewart M. Hanson, Disrict Judge. 
W. R. HUNTSMAN 
Attorney for appellants 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 




MARY RENZO and TONY RENZO, 
Defenda1its, 
and 




BRIEF 013' PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
srrATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
rrhs is an appeal on which respondents defend aris-
ing out of a judgment entered by the Honorable Stewart 
1\1. Hanson, one of the Judges of the Third Judicial 
Court, in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
~aid judgment having been entered on October 11, 1967, 
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arising 01Lt of a eonrt ord<>r datl•d May 31, 19G7. In said 
order appellants, .frssP Uallo and Lena Gallo as "inter-
pleadPd defenda11ts" \\'!'l'l' rn1uired to appear for the 
purpose of having their depositions takPn, (arising out 
of tlwir failure to snbmit to depositions previously on 
F\·brnary 11, 1967). 
HELIEF SOUUHT OK APPEAL 
Respondents seek to snstain the ordPr and subse-
quent judgnwnt of OctobPr 11, 1967. 
STATEMENT O~' FACTS 
Without arguing our pm;ition we will attempt to 
confine this statement of facts to the record before this 
court rather than impose mental reflections. This action 
arises out of the foreclosure of a certain real <::>state 
mortgage on property situate in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The subject matter note and mortgage werP reduced 
to judgment in the exhibit file as ]<~xhihit 1-P and ]~x­
hibit 3-P, respectively. 
An action was commenced to foreclose the above 
mortgage on August 4, 1966 (R. 8 and 9). Appellants' 
counsel filed an answer on behalf of Renzo's, and a com-
plaint in intervention on behalf of appellants. After 
service of answer to interrogatories, a notice of the tak-
ing of the depositions of the Renzos and the Gallos was 
filed on January 27, 1967 (R. :-36) requiring their appear-
ance at the office of respondents on February 11, 1967, 
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at :::;ucces::nve times beginning at 9 :00 a.nt. Ap1>dlants 
through their counsel filed a motion, presumably under 
Hule 30(b), Utah Rnles of Civil Procedun• on Febrnarv ' . 
G, 1967 (R. 37) noticing the same for lwaring on Fehru-
ary 10, 1967, (H. 38) which in substance attempted to 
eliminate their required prest>nce for the purpose of 
having their depositions taken. rrhey argued that they 
had had some interrogatories served upon tlM11, and 
tlw,- might suffer loss of pay for employment if they 
appeared. This motion was denied. 
Thereafter in accordance with the allegations of re-
spondents' motion (R. 39) which motion sets forth the 
appearance of the Renzos and the Gallos at rt>spondents' 
office on February 11, 1967, and the circumstances of the 
Gallos' declining to submit to deposition8! Said motion, 
under Rule 37, and other motions were set down for 
hearing before the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, District 
.JndgP, on March 1, 1967. 
At that hearing, the court had before it respondents' 
motion to dismiss the Gallos' claims against them in Civil 
No. 166824 (R. 6), which motion was heard and granh•d 
h.Y written order dated May 31, 1967 (R. 7) because the 
claiurn ::;et forth in that civil action could be fully adjudi-
<'ated in the civil action now on appeal. 
He8Jlondents further moved the court pursuant to tlH' 
ntk's of civil procedure to publish the deposition of Mary 
Henzo for the reasons stated (R. 42) which motion was 
support(•d o~· thP affid<l\ it or a .;\otary Puhlic (It 44). 
1.1his motion \\·as grankcl hy writkn ordt>r datPd ~lay 31, 
19()/ (R 4(i). The last 1110tion heard before Judge '\Vil-
kins was respondents' motion, undPr Rnle 37, relying 
on the statl•nwnts of eonnsPl, F'ebruary 11, 19G7, and the 
rdusal of appellants' eolms<>l and ap1J1:.•llanb:i to submit 
to havP tht•ir ch•positions taken in the pre::>l'nce of the 
othPr partie:s to this action, which motion also alleged 
\\·i IJful ,-iolation of tlw ndes of eiYil proeednn•; failure of 
t1H• Callos to :sePk a prntectiye order under Hnle 30(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procednn•, (without admitting tlwir 
t·ntitlernent to the ;-;ame) and alleging, becau:se of the 
appellants' willful refmml, n•spond(•nh;' right to expenses, 
attorney::;' fees and othl'r l'.OSts which woHld be incurred 
in rescheduling these depositions at a time when all 1nu-
ties could be present. This motion was also granted 
(R. 49) and the Gallos \\'<:>re ordered to appear in the 
office of respondents on June 16 1967, at J 0 :00 a.m., and 
to, in advance of said hearing, pay the costs and ex1wnses 
awarded by the court. 
On June 5, 1967, appellants filt\d "motion to va<"at<> 
order" (R. 47) attempting to rehash tlw dismissal of 
Civil No. 166824, and setting forth an argument of their 
theory of the ease and further eontPsted the eonrt's 
award of costs and PXJH:nse.s for failure to appt>ar in 
attt>ndanee aft0r notice~ for depositions. This motion was 
heard and argued ,J nn(> 14, 1!)()7; denied hy written ord(•J' 
dakd Augnst 17, 1967 (H. G5) which order permitted 
respondents to n·-1wtice tlw dqJositions of np]>P11ants. 
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The new notice of the taking of the ap1wlianb:.;' <ll'lJO-
sitions scheduled for Octolwr 5, 1967, was filt·d 8eptern-
ber 21, 1967, (R. 67) and served notice of the conditions 
imposed upon appellants' ap1warance as sd forth in the 
.May 31, 1967 order (R. 7). 
Thereaftt~r, appellants on October :2, 1967, filed a 
"motion to strike the depositions" (R 57) alleging the 
Jack of authority of the district court to retit1ire them to 
pay costs and expenses; alleging that there had never 
been a hearing on their obligation to pay costs and ex-
p('nses; and further arguing their case. This motion was 
noticPd for hearing on October 6, 1967, (R. 52). 
Respondents filed motions to dismiss appellants' 
pleadings under Rule 12, and asked the court to hear the 
:-ame on October 6, 1967, and filed an amended notice 
of the taking of depositions for October 11, 1967, at 9 :00 
a.rn., and requested in other motions filed and heard 
on Oetoher 6, 1967, notwithstanding the date which they 
WPrt• noticed for hearing, that the court make otlwr 
reasonable adjustments in the expenses inYolved in haY-
ing all parties present at the taking of the depositions 
in Yiew of the fact that Mary Renzo defendant, had since 
mowd to Redwood City, California, a fad sti1mlatPd 
lidwt><>n respondents' and appellants' counsel in open 
('()lll't. (R. 72) 
At the hearing on October G, J9G7, the court, in its 
order found the claim of appt>llants to lw erroneous (in 
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their eontention that no ht•aring had bPen held on the 
foes and expenses portion of the l\lay :n, 19G7 order) 
( H. 71); that appvllanb ,,,onld bl' n'quin'd to appear for 
thl' pmpost' of haYing their dqJositions taken pursuant 
to the reqllf'8t of com1sel continuing depositions until that 
date a::-; L'vidPnred hy (R. G9); and that as a condition 
precedent to their appearing, appellants pay to respond-
ents, the taxed C(rnfo and e.:qwn8es within hn-nty four 
11ours of said a1i1waurne<', nr th(·ir plPadings would be 
stricken. 
The ord<:>r further contai1wd a prov1s10n for the 
taxing of fees and expt•nses in returning Mary Renzo to 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and back to her home in Redwood 
City, California, should her presence be deemed neces-
sary by respondents after commencing the taking of 
appellants' depositions. 
Upon the failure of appellants to appear on October 
11, 1967, and pursuant to court order, upon the affidavit 
(R. 75) of one of the respondents to that effect, sup-
ported by the transcript of the reporter (Ex. 2-P) and 
based on the record of this case, apvellants' pleadings 
\\'Pre stricken, the ddanlt of tlw U('11zos Pnten•d in accord-
anc<~ with the published deposition of Mary Renzo, and 
respondents were given a judgment by default against the 
Renzos, and the court entned findings in support of its 
striking the pleadings of appellants, to wit; their claimed 
n1ortgagt• interest was obtained by fraud, and the court 
('ntered its judgment of foreclosure accordingly. 
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~-,rom the entry of that judgment in favor of resvond-
<,nts, appellants have appealed. 
POINT I 
'l1H1~ ORDl~R 8TRIKING APPELLANTS' 
PLEADINGS \VAS PROPER UNDER THE 
CIRCFMS'l'ANCES OF 'l'HIS CASE. 
Rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, concern-
ing protective orders, among other vrovisions states: 
" ... that the examination shall be heard with no 
one else present except the parties to the action 
and their officers or counsel. ... " 
It is basic law to entitle a party to have all other parties 
iiresent when depositions are being taken. See Barron 
& Holtzoff, Wright Ed. Federal Practice & Procedure, 
r al. 2A, Section 715.1, at page 246 (discussing Rule 
30 (b) : 
"As the rule clearly implies, a party, or the 
officer of a corporate party, cannot be excluded 
from the taking of the deposition." 
Respondents do not wish to impose on this court, the 
foregoing as an unequivocable statement of the law, 
recognizing that occasions may exist \Yhen, after proper 
i:ihowing in advance of a deposition or after terminating 
1md0r Rule 30(d), a court might make snch an order; 
howewr the record in this case is void of such evidence, 
and as is clearly indicated by the transcript of the pro-
ceedings of .F'ebrnary 11, HHi7, whl'l'(•in apiwllanh;' coun-
sel refused to havP his clients submit to having their 
depositions taken, such refusal "·as 1wi ther in accordance 
with tlw rnl<•s of in·oe<>dnn• 11or within tlw laws of this 
state. 
Our rules of procedurP are reasonahl:· knient with 
persons declining discon'r:-. R<>spondt'nts sought and 
received in successive orders tht' lWnnissible sanctions 
which a trial judge could impose starting from the lowest 
to the most extreme and at all tirnPs, as is Pvid<mced l>y 
the statt•11wnt of facts in this ea:,.w, ·were delayed at the 
last minut{~ by 8lllH'I-flnous and n•pPtitin• motions. The 
first sanction imposed hy the court was the pay1nPnt of 
costs and expt>nses ( ~ef~ Rule 37 (a)) for the wi llfnl re-
f nsal to submit to the taking of their deposition::;. The 
second sought and obtaint'd sanction, upon their next 
refusal to aprwar, was tlit· striking of tlwir pleadings 
and appropriate judgment in a<'cordance with the file8 
and record as it then appear<--d. ( SPP Hnle 37 (h) and ( d)) 
The statement of faets in this casl' as wt>ll as tlw record 
adequately slwws that the appellants at no time intPnded 
to pennit their depositions to he taken and the lower 
conrt acted in accordance with the latitude bestowed upon 
it i11 Rasln.try v. Baimon, 15 Utah 2d 62, 387 P2d. 239, 
rn entering the sanctions and orders of May 31, 1967, 
et Sf~q. 
As aptly stated jn Tucker Bealty Compa11y Inc., i·. 
Nwiley, 16 Utah 2d. 97, 39(i P2d. 410, this eonrt said, at 
Utal1, pag-e 100: 
"E · t . xcep. m ver~' aggravated ca~es less .ser-
• • , . , ' . I 'I' 
1ous sanct10ns, (the granting of defanlt judgment) 
undoubtedly could be applied to' accomplish the 
desirPd result, particularly where tlwte is any 
likelihood of injustice by depriving a party of a 
meritorious cause of action or defense. ·whether 
the failure to comply with the court's order has 
ht>en wilful and whether the circumstances are so 
aggravated as to justify the action taken is. pri-
marily for the trial court to determine." See Bitr-
ton v. Zion's Cooperative Mrrcantile Institiition, 
122 Utah 3GO, 249 P. 2d 541; Charlton i:. Hackett, 
11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 17(i. 
rrliis record adl'quatt>ly supports tlw numerol'ts at-
tempts of respondents' to take appellants' depositions 
nnd(~r tlw circumstances to which they are entitled under 
th(' rules of civil procedure, and further, emphatica1ly 
~'hows appellants' total lack of wilingness to abide hy 
those Rules. 
The numerous motions "to reconsider" are in viola-
tion of the theory of Drnry v. Limceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 
J.15 P.2cl (i()2, wliPn' snc]1 delay tactics are violation of 
tlw d(•eisions of this Court and its rnles of procednre. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Point [ of appellants' brief bt'ing moot beeause of 
il1l' order of dismissal ·with pr0;judice dated 1\[ay 31, 
1%7, a11d no appeal having heen taken tlwrdrorn, is not 
dist·nssed. 
rt1lw Tt'lllaining points in appt•llants' hrief han:' been 
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adequately coven•d by the statPrnent of facts and rPf Pr-
encP to the recent cases of this conrt. RespondPnh; n•-
spectfully submit tlte judguwnt order of the lower court, 
has<>d on the previous orders of the lowf'r court, is cor-
rc>ct as a matfrr of law: and reqrn·st this eonrt sustain 
the judgment on file herein and remand tltis case with 
orders to proceed with th<> ordPr of sale, taxing costs in 
favor of respondents. 
R0sp0ctfu1ly submitted, 
HATCH & McRAE 
By RobPrt M. McRae 
